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SYNOPSIS 
Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative 
likelihood and severity of the residual risk.  These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and 
Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event.  A three-dimensional method, described herein, 
utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as 
the Level of Control.  The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps 
(also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence).  These steps are:  1. Eliminate risk through design.  2. 
Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials.  3. Install safety devices.  4. Install caution and warning 
devices.  5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.)  6. Provide protective 
clothing and equipment.  When added to the two-dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual 
representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a ‘tall-pole’ for the least-well-controlled 
failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard.  
Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-dimensional charting gives a visual 
confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls. 
INTRODUCTION 
Practitioners of System Safety methodology are inventive by nature.  In order to predict and control the risks of a 
new venture, the analyst must be able to identify the hazards that may be present, prescribe corrective actions, and 
provide some level of assurance that management has made the appropriate decision of safety versus acceptable risk. 
Tools that may be used by System Safety analysts include the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) or Logic Model (LM), and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  These methods are 
extremely detailed and, at times, very difficult for the uninitiated to understand.  At the completion of each phase of 
the analysis, management is apprised of the residual risks that have been identified. 
It is at this time that the Safety Professional must stand and explain, in detail, the status of the analysis. It is also at 
this time that Safety Professionals usually step out of their comfort zone.  What is needed is a method, which utilizes 
the same ‘dog-and-pony’ techniques, which the managers are comfortable with…and familiar. 
BACKGROUND 
As soon as a new project is identified, managers begin to theorize what gains are to be made from the venture, and 
what risks are involved.  If a new, highly technical design is to be developed, such as a composite aircraft, a space 
shuttle, or robot, the call goes out for many varied and highly specialized technicians.  These technicians include 
engineers, designers, accountants, and Safety Professionals. 
When the new project is sufficiently detailed to identify what its purpose is to be, the professionals perform initial 
analyses.  The engineers perform trade studies to identify the alternative methods or designs; the accountants 
perform risk assessments to determine what the marketability and return-on-investment is likely to be; and the 
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System Safety Professional performs a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). A checklist of Generic Hazards may be 
used to guide the creation of the PHA. A partial list is shown as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Partial List of Generic Hazards 
 
THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The PHA, sometimes referred to as a Preliminary Hazard Screening, is the initial cut at identifying the hazards 
associated with a selected design or process. The PHA may be presented in a tabular format like that shown in 
Figure 2.  As the analysis develops, Causes, Effects, Controls, and Verifications are added to the Hazardous 
Condition and Safety Requirements already identified in the earliest stages of analysis.  The Severity and Likelihood 
are usually the last elements to be added, based on the perceived outcome of the hazardous condition following the 
application of controls   the analysis may look like that in Figure 2.  
 Figure 2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Following the selection of the ‘lowest-business-risk’ model, additional designs or processes are refined.  This 
design-analyze-redesign sequence is critical for the Safety Professional.  It is at this point that the final controls are 
identified in order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.  The Safety Professional knows that by performing a 
high quality analysis, the product is more likely to be successful and profitable.  The Safety Professional should 
‘lead the design’ as much as possible.  Identification of hazards late in the design phase is likely to result in costly 
redesign or cancellation of the venture if the perceived risk is too great.  Either of these outcomes may be 
embarrassing for all parties. 
However, it happens. 
One of the causes of such an unfortunate outcome could be the lack of management understanding of the hazards 
involved.  This could be as a result of “Safety people talking to Safety people because no one else will talk to them.”  
It is an all-too-often occurrence that the message regarding the residual risks may have been undersold.  A possible 
cause of this is the lack of management understanding of the risks due to an overwhelming amount of technical data 
thrown at a non-technical audience.  One of the methods used by the Safety Professional to reduce this ‘data 
overload’ is the use of Severity-to-Likelihood matrices.  Figures 3 and 4 are examples of risk matrices.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Risk Matrix (3 X 4) 
Figure 4 Constellation Program Risk Matrix (5 x 5) 
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Note:  Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence without Controls In Place
Hazard Categorization 
NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle Program Hazard Analyses (NSTS 22254) provides the 
following definition of Severity Levels. 
 
The severity level is an assessment of the most severe effects of a hazard. Complete for each cause (with the 
exception of those causes which transfer to other Hazard Reports) for all controls and verifications by assessing the 
most severe effect and documenting it as catastrophic, critical, or marginal. 
(a) Catastrophic: Hazard could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to personnel and/or loss of one or 
more major elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility. 
(b) Critical: Hazard could result in serious injury to personnel and/or damage to flight or ground equipment 
which would cause mission abort or a significant program delay. 
(c) Marginal: Hazard could result in a mishap of minor nature inflicting first−aid injury to personnel and/or 
damage to flight or ground equipment which can be tolerated without abort or repaired without 
significant program delay. 
 
The severity is plotted on the X axis as seen in Figure 3.  The severity increases from left to right. 
The Likelihood of Occurrence is an assessment of the most severe effects of a hazard transpiring. Complete for each 
cause (with the exception of those causes which transfer to other HR[s] for all controls and verifications) by 
assessing the controls that are in place and documenting them as probable, infrequent, remote, or improbable. 
Likelihood is assessed considering the effectiveness of the controls in place for the life of the program. 
(a) Probable: Expected to happen in the life of the program. If quantitative risk analyses are used to assist 
in likelihood determination, then for a cause to be considered probable, the single mission risk should 
have a mean probability greater than 1 in 200. 
NOTE: In cases where the mean probability is less than 1 in 200, a cause may still be classified as probable 
once other factors, such as the level of uncertainty associated with the controls, are taken into account. 
Conversely, a mean probability of greater than 1 in 200 in itself should not automatically result in a cause being 
classified as probable if certainty in the controls provides a basis for not doing so. 
(b) Infrequent: Could happen in the life of the program. Controls have significant limitations or 
uncertainties. 
(c) Remote: Could happen in the life of the program, but not expected. Controls have minor limitations or 
uncertainties. 
(d) Improbable: Extremely remote possibility that it will happen in the life of the program. Strong controls 
in place. 
 
The Likelihood is plotted as the Y axis, also shown in Figure 3 and increases from bottom to top. 
 
Other reference documents utilize differing descriptions of the Severity and Likelihood; these are shown in Figures 
5 and 6, representing the MIL-STD-882 definitions of severity and probability.  For purposes of this paper, 
likelihood and probability are considered to be one and the same. 
MIL-STD-882D has identified a set of mishap risk mitigation measures that identifies potential mishap risk 
mitigation alternatives and the expected effectiveness of each alternative or method. Mishap risk mitigation is an 
iterative process that culminates when the residual mishap risk has been reduced to a level acceptable to the 
appropriate authority. The system safety design order of precedence for mitigating identified hazards is: 
a. Eliminate hazards through design selection. If unable to eliminate an identified hazard, reduce the associated 
mishap risk to an acceptable level through design selection. 
b. Incorporate safety devices. If unable to eliminate the hazard through design selection, reduce the mishap risk to an 
acceptable level using protective safety features or devices. 
c. Provide warning devices. If safety devices do not adequately lower the mishap risk of the hazard, include a 
detection and warning system to alert personnel to the particular hazard. 
d. Develop procedures and training. Where it is impractical to eliminate hazards through design selection or 
to reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level with safety and warning devices, incorporate special procedures 
and training. Procedures may include the use of personal protective equipment. For hazards assigned Catastrophic or 
Critical mishap severity categories, avoid using warning, caution, or other written advisory as the only risk reduction 
method. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 MIL-STD-882 Mishap Severity Definitions 
 
Figure 6 MIL-STD-882 Mishap Probability Definitions 
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL DISPLAY PROCESS 
Those same intuitive, inventive people who are called upon to perform hazard analyses are usually computer literate, 
either by desire or by requirements of the job.  A plethora of software has been developed for the offices of 
worldwide businesses.  Along with it came an infusion of new techniques that may be used to visualize data.  It is 
not uncommon for the Safety Department to have high-performance computers available to the Safety Professional. 
In most cases, the computers have sophisticated software that aids in the analysis of hazards, generating charts, fault 
trees, tables, and other statistical reports.  This enables the sharing of data and transfer of corporate intelligence to a 
wide and diversified audience who may incorporate this information into new reports. 
One of the most useful of the personal computer software packages is the database/spreadsheet. It is through the use 
of spreadsheets, including Microsoft’s Excel and Corel’s Quattro Pro and their ability to produce three-dimensional 
charts that the generation of the Three Dimensional Risk Assessment is made possible. 
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Figure 7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis for a Pressure Vessel 
 
In this example, the hazardous condition has been identified to have five potential causes. Each cause is lettered 
sequentially as a), b), c), d), or e).  The Hazard Elimination/Control Provisions are developed based on the best-
available information, including safety requirements that are anticipated, or in place prior to project initialization.  
Figure 8, below, adds a note in the Hazard Elimination/Control Provisions column to indicate the perceived Level of 
Control represented by the controls. 
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 Figure 8 Preliminary Hazard Analysis for a Pressure Vessel with Level of Control added 
The elements of the Z-axis contained in the Three Dimensional Risk Representation are modifications of the Hazard 
Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence).  These steps are: 
 
0. Eliminate risk through design. 
1. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 
2. Install safety devices.  
3. Install caution and warning devices. 
4. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 
5. Provide protective clothing and equipment.  
Figure 9 shows a typical screen from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that demonstrates the method of incorporating 
Severity, Likelihood, and Level of Control into a visual representation of the causes, the resultant risk, and the 
amount of control afforded to limiting the risk. In this table, the Level of Control is represented by the number, or 
level of control, of each cause. 
 
SEVERITY MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC 
LIKELIHOOD    
IMPROBABLE 0a  4e 
REMOTE  2b  
INFREQUENT   4c 
PROBABLE   3d 
 
Figure 9 Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet Screenshot 
When converted to a three-dimensional view, the information contained in the spreadsheet generates the chart 
shown below. 
 
Figure 10 Three-Dimensional View of Severity, Likelihood, and Level of Control 
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATION 
It is true that during a hazard analysis or assessment, the analyst will determine what the likelihood of a hazard will 
be and the outcome if it is uncontrolled.  This two-dimensional process is plotted on a matrix where it can be 
visualized.  It is important that managers understand what they are viewing when a risk matrix is displayed.  It is 
unfortunate that the controls identified during the analysis may be lost during the visual and oral presentations. 
When automated, the spreadsheet prepares a standard presentation style chart such as that shown in Figure 10.  As 
demonstrated by the chart, the level of Severity increases from left-to-right; the Likelihood of Occurrence increases 
from front to back; and the Level of Control is displayed in such a manner as to raise the lowest control measure to 
the highest point on the Z axis – thereby producing the ‘tall-pole’. 
A tall-pole in the left-front square may then be identified as a lower risk than a tall-pole in the right-back corner. 
It is at this point in the analysis that the Safety Professional can demonstrate that reducing the risk through judicious 
use of the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence will result in a lower programmatic risk and a safer system.  As 
controls are improved, the matrix can be modified to demonstrate a reduced level of exposure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Safety Professional has many tools available to assist in displaying the results of analyses.  Traditional two-
dimensional matrices have been used successfully for many years.  Today’s managers require easily understood 
presentations that demonstrate as much information as possible.  Personal computers coupled with available 
software make this job easier. 
With more information available at a glance, management has the opportunity to make business decisions that can 
improve the safety of the project under review, increase the profitability, and reduce costs of redesign at the earliest 
possible time. 
PREPARED BY
CLIFFORD WATSON, CSP
NASA
 INTRODUCTION
 Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional 
representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and 
severity of the residual risk.  
 These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and 
Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event.  
 A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the 
traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, 
shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. 
 Tools Used by the Safety Analyst
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Logic Model (LM)
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 These tools are detailed and may be difficult for uninitiated 
persons to understand
 System Safety analysts must be able to present the information 
developed by these tools to explain the results of these analyses
 Traditional tools are two-dimensional and present limited data from 
the analysis
 New projects require early analysis by System Safety
 Early techniques may begin with the Preliminary Hazard Analysis
 As an aid to the analyst, Generic Hazard Lists may be used
 Using the Generic Hazard List, the Safety Analyst prepares a 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
 PHAs are developed as the design advances; Hazardous 
Conditions are identified first, with Safety Requirements identified 
as basic controls.
 An early use of the PHA may be the identification of the “lowest-
business-risk” model
 Following this, redesign may be required
 Early identification of hazardous conditions, and the resultant re-design can be 
a substantial cost savings, since hardware hasn’t been built, or the use of 
‘boiler plate’ models is significantly less to manufacture
 Thus, the System Safety Engineer becomes an integral participant in the 
design-analyze-redesign sequence.
 System Safety should be involved as early as possible in the 
analysis of new systems, and may, in some cases, ‘lead’ the 
design
 Identification of uncontrollable hazards late in design and lead to 
cancellation of the project if the perceived risk is too high
 System Safety Engineers have the ability to address the hazards 
in a manner that is easy for Management to understand
 The selection of tools is important
 The most frequently used method of displaying relative risk is the 
Severity-Likelihood Matrix
 Matrices are frequently customized for the project
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Note:  Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence without Controls In Place
 NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle Program 
Hazard Analysis (NSTS 22254) provides the following definition 
of Severity Levels
 Severity Levels
 (a)  Catastrophic: Hazard could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to 
personnel and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or 
ground facility
 (b)  Critical:  Hazard could result in serious injury to personnel and/or damage 
to flight or ground equipment which would cause mission abort or a significant 
program delay.
 (c)  Marginal:  Hazard could result in a mishap of minor nature inflicting first-aid 
injury to personnel and/or damage to flight or ground equipment which can be 
tolerated without abort or repaired without significant program delay.
 Severity is plotted on the “X” axis
 Severity increases from left to right
 NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle Program 
Hazard Analysis (NSTS 22254) provides the following definition 
of Likelihood, or Probability of Occurrence
 Likelihood
 (a)  Probable:  Expected to happen in the life of the program…a single mission 
risk should have a mean probability greater than 1 in 200
 (b)  Infrequent:  Could happen in the life of the program.  Controls have 
significant limitations or uncertainties
 (c)  Remote:  Could happen in the life of the program, but not expected.  
Controls have minor limitations or uncertainties
 (d)  Improbable:  Extremely remote possibility that it will happen in the life of the 
program.  Strong controls in place.
 Likelihood is plotted on the “Y” axis
 Likelihood increases from bottom to top
 LEVEL OF CONTROL
 MIL-STD-882D has identified a set of mishap risk mitigation 
measures that identifies potential mishap risk mitigation 
alternatives and the expected effectiveness of each alternative or 
method. 
 a. Eliminate hazards through design selection.
 b. Incorporate safety devices.
 c. Provide warning devices.
 d. Develop procedures and training.
 LEVEL OF CONTROL
 A Modified Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence has been 
developed and adds two additional levels of control.  They are:
 0. Eliminate risk through design.
 1. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials.
 2. Install safety devices. 
 3. Install caution and warning devices.
 4. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures 
and training.)
 5. Provide protective clothing and equipment
As you see, this Sequence gives a weight to each level of control; the 
weighting is inverted to provide a ‘tall-pole’ in following charts to 
indicate low-level controls ‘poking up’
Now let us see how these elements come together in
a traditional Risk Matrix
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
HAZARD
CAUSE
HAZARD
EFFECT
SEVERITY
LEVEL
SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS
HAZARD
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PROVISIONS
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program
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vessel; injury
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d) Vehicle 
collision
Destruction of 
vessel; injury
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Signs limiting traffic 
in vicinity
Monthly Safety Dept. 
inspection
Probable
e)  Relief valve 
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vessel; injury
Catastrophic Install relief valve Relief valve annual 
testing
Maintenance Dept. 
testing
Improbable
Now let us see how these elements come together in
a revised Risk Matrix that adds Level of Control
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
HAZARD
CAUSE
HAZARD
EFFECT
SEVERITY
LEVEL
SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS
HAZARD
ELIMINATION 
/CONTROL
PROVISIONS
VERIFICATION LIKELIHOOD OF 
OCCURRENCE
Low pressure 
vessel ruptures
a.  Inadequate 
design
Destruction of 
vessel
Marginal – hydro 
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Design to ASME Code Qualified designer
LOC= 0
Verified by 
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Improbable
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pressure supply
Destruction of 
vessel
Critical Systems shall not have 
interchangeable 
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LOC=2
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painting
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On plant inspection 
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LOC=4
Maintenance Dept. 
testing
Improbable
 Transfer the data from the table to a spreadsheet
 Set up a Sheet that will create a 3-D chart from the information
 Transfer the data from the table to a spreadsheet
 This is a traditional two-dimensional matrix
 Using the definitions for Likelihood, it is possible to identify the Level of Control, 
but it is not visible in this format
X X
X
X
X
 Transfer the data from the table to a Three-Dimensional 
spreadsheet
 The data quickly and visibly displays the three elements of Severity, Likelihood, 
and Level of Control
 This format permits easy recognition of the ‘tall-poles’ that may be the most 
likely candidates for additional controls
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 Hazard Analyses are an important tool for Management
 Analyses should be able to answer these, and other, questions
 Is the design adequate for the needs?
 Is a redesign necessary, or prudent?
 What are the issues that must be overcome?
 What will it cost to fix the worst hazardous conditions?
 How solid are the controls that prevent the hazardous 
conditions?
 Is the project worthy of additional time, manpower, and 
expenditure?
 The Three-Dimensional Risk Matrix will provide visual 
answers to many of these questions.
